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Abstract
The conditional three-valued logic of Calabrese is applied to the language L∗ of conditionals
on propositional variables with finite domain. The conditionals in L∗ serve as a means for the
construction and manipulation of probability distributions respecting the Principle of Maximum
Entropy and of Minimum Relative Entropy. This principle allows a sound inference even in the
presence of uncertain evidence. The inference is directed, it respects a probabilistic version of Modus
Ponens—not of Modus Tollens—, it permits transitive chaining and supports a cautious monotony.
Conjunctive, conditional and material deduction are manageable in this probabilistic logic, too. The
concept is not merely theoretical, but enables large-scale applications in the expert system-shell
SPIRIT. Ó 2000 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A great part of (human) intelligence is the knowledge up to which degree things
condition each other. “If A then B” is a constituent of this knowledge. Pattern recognition,
technical and medical diagnosis and last not least the logic of (mathematical) deduction
make use of such elementary rules aggregating them to complex structures.
To avoid a redundant storage of all dependencies between A’s and B’s, deduction
principles are available. If situative conditions or facts become evident, desired answers
can be entailed by these principles from stored and from deduced knowledge.
Dominating vagueness and nonmonotony, humans are able to overcome the restrictive
limits of propositional and predicative logics. Even very sophisticated approaches to
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imitate this ability by uncertain logics were successful only partly; in [12] a group of
scientists, named “Lea Sombé”, surveys the logics and their limitations.
Within the last decade a growing number of authors study probabilistic knowledge
models. Here a probability distribution expresses dependencies and independencies
between variables and their respective attributes. If facts or rules become evident, the
effects on the distribution are calculed by “propagation”. The various models differ on how
to build up distributions and how to use them for inference. An already established form
to model dependency and independency are Bayes nets and Markov nets, cf. Lauritzen
and Spiegelhalter in their classical paper “Local Computation with Probabilities in
Graphical Structures and their Application in Expert Systems” [11] or Pearl’s monography
Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems [15].
From the beginning probability theory was strongly related to logics: Tarski [23], de
Finetti [6], Calabrese [1], Dubois and Prade [7], among others, study the connections be-
tween logics and—subjective—probabilities. Especially Calabrese derives a rich condi-
tional logic on a field of conditional events in a probability space.
In the present paper we describe how the attribution of probabilities to conditionals
allows the construction of a distribution P ∗ respecting the Principle of Maximum Entropy.
This principle avoids unnecessary dependencies between the involved variables. P ∗ serves
as a medium for deduction which is based on the Principle of Minimum Relative Entropy.
Both forms of knowledge processing, the acquisition and the deduction, we therefore call
ME-inference. Note that for the subcase of propositions instead of conditionals there are
early works on this subject; we quote Williams [25] and further references given therein.
Even though this knowledge acquisition and deduction is intensional and does not make
use of extensional operators for ∧ and ∨ like, e.g., in fuzzy logic [26], we show that ME-
entailment respects certain desired and important demands.
So a probabilistic Modus Ponens is valid in this framework and what follows from it,
so transitive chaining and a cautious monotony hold. Furthermore deduction principles, as
presented by Calabrese [1], are compatible with this ME-inference.
In Section 2 we give the mathematical and logical prerequisites. In Section 3 we define
ME-inference, and in the following Section 4 we study its properties. In particular, we
show that
• it respects a probabilistic form of Modus Ponens (Section 4.2),
• it allows for entailments by aggregating rules (Section 4.3),
• it is compatible with Calabrese’s conditional logic (Section 4.4).
Section 5 summarises results and shows the road ahead. Mathematical tools as far as
they concern ME-inference, are offered in Appendix A.
2. Conditionals and probability
The basis for knowledge processing is a finite set of finite-valued variables V =
{V1, . . . , VL}. Let P be a probability measure on the algebra of all events on V , with Ω
and ∅ being the all and the empty event. If ve are values or realisations of Ve, the events
can be identified in a natural way with propositional sentences, built from literals Ve = ve
by the connectives negation, conjunction and disjunction. The set of all such propositional
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sentences is the language L. We write elements of L as capital letters, indexed if necessary:
A,B,C, . . . ,Ai,Ej ,Gk . If A is such a proposition, its probability is P(A)=∑v⊂A P(v),
where the summation is taken over all conjunctions in the canonical disjunctive form of A.
Since events and propositions are used synonymously, we write both v ∈A and v ⊂A; in
either case we sayA(v)= t (true) orA(v)= f (false), otherwise. The logical expressionA
is true or false in the world v. If A is true (false) on the whole Ω , we write A= t (A= f ).
Calabrese [1] generalises propositions to conditionals, B|A, A and B being elements of
L. Different from Calabrese we restrict our attention to finite Ω’s, only.
The exact definition of a conditional in [1] reads
B|A(v)=

t if v ⊂AB (=A∧B),
f if v ⊂AB (=A∧B),
u if v ⊂A,
(1)
where barring means negation, ∧ conjunction and u is “undefined”. Note that conditionals
in any world v obey a three-valued logic, in which −,∧,∨, apply on {t, f, } as usual and
for u as follows:
t ∧ u= t ∨ u= t, f ∧ u= f ∨ u= f, u∧ u= u∨ u= u, u¯= u.
For a detailed discussion of this logic see Rescher [16].
The set of all conditionals B|A is the language L∗. If we identify B|Ω with B , the
unconditioned propositions L form a subset of L∗. Similar as in L we write B|A = t|A
(= f |A), if the conditional is true (false) on the whole A.
For a conditional B|A and for P(A) > 0 we define P(B|A) = P(AB)/P(A), i.e., the
probability of a conditional is identified with its conditional probability. These conditional
probabilities are the basis for a sound inference principle in the space (Ω,P ), as we
develop in the next section.
For that reason it will be necessary to construct a distribution P which for given
probabilities xi and for conditionals Bi |Ai satisfies P(Bi |Ai) = xi . If there is no doubt
about the P under consideration, we use the simplifying notation Bi |Ai[xi] instead of
P(Bi |Ai)= xi .
With these agreements we are ready to present the ME-principle of inference.
3. Inference and the Principle of Entropy
The author, together with Kern-Isberner, in [17] develops the idea of an ME-inference
based on conditionals. It permits a logically sound entailment of knowledge from facts and
rules.
The basic steps of this inference process are:
(i) Let P 0 be a prior distribution on Ω . P 0 expresses the prior knowledge about all
(in)dependencies between the variables in V . If this prior is uniform, it represents
absolute independence. Let us assume this to be the initial case in the remainder
of our paper so as to isolate the impact of conditional information on the inference
process.
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Consider furthermore a set R = {Bi |Ai[xi], i = 1, . . . , I } of conditionals from
L∗ with desired probabilities xi . Such expressions we call (probabilistic) rules; if
they are in L and hence unconditioned, we call them (probabilistic) facts.
From P 0 and R we derive the unique distribution P ∗ on Ω , which solves the
optimisation problem
MinR(Q,P 0)=
∑
v
Q(v) log2
Q(v)
P 0(v)
, (2)
where Q is a distribution subject to Q| =R, that is
Q(Bi |Ai)= xi for all i = 1, . . . , I.
Among all distributions Q respecting the rules and facts in R, P ∗ minimises the
relative entropy R(Q,P 0). R measures the distance from Q to P 0. As it is not
symmetrical, it is often called directed divergence [21]. Bear in mind that for a
uniform P 0 minimising the relative entropy in (2) is equivalent to maximising the
entropy
H(Q)=−
∑
v
Q(v) log2Q(v).
In (2) P ∗ is inferred from R. Shore and Johnson [20], Csiszàr [5], Kern-Isberner
[9], Paris and Vencovská [14] show independently from each other that the
inference principle realised in (2) can be derived from elementary axioms, whose
validity we assume further on. Especially the paper [9] focuses independence as the
related property to entropy: P ∗ is not only of maximal entropy but also maintains
independence between the variables Ve as far as possible. Dependencies are only
imposed in P ∗, if explicitly demanded by R, see also [19, p. 272].
ME-deducible from R are all rules D|C and facts D|Ω with their respective
probabilities valid in P ∗:
R |=∗ D|C, D|Ω if and only if P ∗ |=D|C, D|Ω.
P ∗ is the knowledge base inferred from R.
(ii) Let P ∗ be the distribution on Ω as calculated in (i). It expresses all knowledge
about the variables V , deducible from R.
Consider furthermore a set E = {Fj |Ej [yj ], j = 1, . . . , J } of conditionals
from L∗ with desired probabilities yj . These facts and rules constitute Evident
knowledge or situative knowledge. Evident knowledge consists of temporary
assumptions about the variables’ dependencies, different from those adapted in
P ∗. E is not part of the knowledge base, it vanishes after the consequences of
evident knowledge were evaluated.
To infer from these evident assumptions we calculate the unique distribution P ∗∗
on Ω , which solves the optimisation problem
MinR(Q,P ∗)=
∑
v
Q(v) log2
Q(v)
P ∗(v)
, (3)
where Q is a distribution subject to Q |=E, that is
Q(Fj |Ej)= yi for all j = 1, . . . , J.
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Among all distributions Q satisfying the rules and facts in E, P ∗∗ minimises
the relative entropy R(Q,P ∗). P ∗∗ respects evidence and maintains dependencies
from P ∗ as far as possible. The basic papers [5,9,14,20] apply here in the same
manner as they did in (i).
(iii) Let P ∗∗ be the distribution on Ω as calculated in (ii). Consider facts or rules
Hk|Gk, k = 1, . . . ,K , from L∗, representing queries about their respective
probabilities in P ∗∗. The evaluated probabilities zk of these conditionals
Hk|Gk[zk], k = 1, . . . ,K, (4)
are knowledge inferred from evidence E and from P ∗.
Any inference which follows the principle developed in (i)–(iii), is called ME-inference
here, as it processes probabilistic information by virtue of maximising entropy and
minimising relative entropy.
The ME-inference process respects sophisticated axioms and may be considered a
generalisation of Bayes’ reasoning, as we show in the example below. To apply this
inference scheme on a large scale, mathematical tools must be available to solve (2) and
(3) efficiently and to manage probability distributions on a great number of variables V .
The reader interested in these technical details is referred to [18]. The authors discourse
on an expert system-shell named SPIRIT and on applications with hundreds of rules and
umpteen variables. A rough idea how to solve (2) and (3) is offered in Appendix A.
The following example closes this section. It serves as a demonstration of the presented
inference principle and shows its closeness to Bayes’ reasoning.
Example 1. At a traffic control point a policeman observes the following attributes: Sex of
driver (m/f ), result of a Drug test (d (positive)/n (negative)) and car-Type ( l (luxurious)/s
(average)).
Suppose that from historical data we learned the following facts and rules: 40% of all
drivers are females, 2% of which are drugged, much less than 16% of males.
In terms of this section we have
R = {B1|A1[x1],B2|A2[x2],B3|A3[x3]}
= {S = f |Ω[0.40],D= d|S = f [0.02],D= d|S =m[0.16]}.
Deriving P ∗ from R as in (2) yields the following distribution P ∗ as knowledge base
(see Table 1). We observe, that the solution of (2) does not generate any unnecessary
dependencies between T and the remaining variables. The type of car does influence
neither sex nor drug-behaviour. Following Bayes’ theorem we calculate
P ∗(ST |D = d)= P
∗(D = d|ST ) · P ∗(ST )
P ∗(D = d)
and hence the evident fact of a person to be drug-positive leads to P ∗∗ in Table 2. P ∗∗ is
also the solution of (3) for
E = {(F |E[y])}≡ {(D = d|Ω[1.0])}.
Certain evidence D = d yields the same P ∗∗ as Bayes’ theorem, cf. Lemma A.1 in
Appendix A. Evaluating P ∗∗ for the special query H |G ≡ S = m|Ω results in S =
88 W. Rödder / Artificial Intelligence 117 (2000) 83–106
Table 1
S D T P ∗
m n l 0.2520
m n s 0.2520
m d l 0.0480
m d s 0.0480
f n l 0.1960
f n s 0.1960
f d l 0.0040
f d s 0.0040
Table 2
S D T P ∗∗
m n l 0.0
m n s 0.0
m d l 0.4615
m d s 0.4615
f n l 0.0
f n s 0.0
f d l 0.0385
f d s 0.0385
m[0.924]. If the driving person is evidently drugged, the probability of being male rises
significantly to approximately 92%.
To continue, we now assume uncertain evidence on D = d with y = 0.8. Uncertain
evidence occurs when our subjective impression of things remains vague instead of sure.
Hence
E = {F |E[y]} ≡ d|Ω[0.8]}.
A fast calculation in accordance with (3) results in Table 3. Even this distribution can be
derived from a generalisation of Bayes’ theorem. If the fact D = d is uncertain and only
known with probabilityQ(D = d)= y , we have
P ∗
(
ST |Q(D = d))= P ∗(ST |D = d) · y + P ∗(ST |D = n)(1− y). 2
Bayes’ theorem becomes insufficient for more than one uncertain evident fact or for
uncertain evident rules. Uncertain evident facts and rules allow for a very rich interaction
between knowledge base and user. Here the policeman’s subjective impression might be
that evidently at a special evening 20% of all cars are luxurious and that this percentage
rises significantly to 80% for male drivers. Note that this impression is only temporary
and does not influence the whole populations distribution. What is the consequence of all
information available in P ∗, in the light of actual evidence?
The evidence
E = {T = l|Ω[0.2], T = l|S =m[0.8]}
yields the P ∗∗ which we received from the software tool SPIRIT [18] (see Table 4). The
immediate answer to the query H |G ≡ T = l|S = f in P ∗∗ is 5.53% according to (4).
Women rarely would drive a Mercedes or a BMW if there were a temporary evidence that
only 20% of all cars are luxurious and still predominantly appropriated by men.
2 This formula sometimes is called “Jeffrey condinionalisation”, cf. [24].
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Table 3
S D T P ∗∗
m n l 0.0562
m n s 0.0562
m d l 0.3692
m d s 0.3692
f n l 0.0437
f n s 0.0437
f d l 0.0308
f d s 0.0308
Table 4
S D T P ∗∗
m n l 0.1306
m n s 0.0327
m d l 0.0249
m d s 0.0062
f n l 0.0436
f n s 0.7459
f d l 0.0009
f d s 0.0152
4. Properties of inference under maximum entropy
4.1. General considerations
In Section 3 we reviewed the principle of ME-inference and the derivation of P ∗ from
R. In P ∗ all facts and rules of R are valid and what can be deduced from them.
P ∗ serves as “machine” for further inference. A reason for further inference are evident
facts and rules in E not valid in P ∗. Applying E to P ∗ as in (3) yields P ∗∗. P ∗∗ is inferred
from E and P ∗. In P ∗∗ all facts and rules of E are valid and what can be deduced from
them.
P ∗∗ has minimum directed divergence from P ∗ and hence maintains the information
about dependencies in P ∗ as far as possible. In P ∗∗ any query can be evaluated and its
respective probability provided to the user.
The whole process (2), (3), (4) constitutes an ideal probabilistic deduction scheme. Up to
which degree the probabilistic (uncertain) inference meets our intuition, is the topic of this
section. In Section 4.2 we investigate the validity of Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens, in
Section 4.3 we study the effects of rule aggregation and in Section 4.4 apply ME-inference
to Calabrese’s composed rules and entailment schemes.
4.2. Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens
Modus Ponens (MP) is the deduction scheme
A→B
A
B
,
A, B denoting propositions and→ material implication. Modus Ponens is fundamental
for entailments in a binary logic. In a probabilistic environment it is modified threefold: 3
• The logical propositions are not certain but uncertain.
3 Suppes in [22] suggests a probabilistic MP, different from what follows in this section. It does not demand
the rigid ME-framework and therefore is “weaker” in its consequences.
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• Material implication A→ B is replaced by the conditional; consult the detailed
discussion in [17, p. 640].
• since MP is a special case of the inference steps (2), (3), (4) in Section 3, this order of
processing becomes essential for the result.
The probabilistic MP within the framework described above, now reads:
B|A [x] (2)
A [y] (3)
B [z] (4).
(5)
It has the following interpretation:
• Given a set R of facts and rules and a P ∗ inferred from it as in (2), x is the probability
of the conditional B|A in P ∗.
• The simple evident fact E = {A[y]} gives rise to the calculation of P ∗∗.
• The result of MP is the probability z of fact B in P ∗∗.
Theorem 1 gives an estimation of z= P ∗∗(B) depending upon the adopted probabilities x
and y .
Theorem 1 (Modus Ponens). Under the assumptions of MP as in (5) and the underlying
interpretation, we have
x · y 6 z6 x · y + (1− y).
Proof.
z= P ∗∗(B)= P ∗∗(BA)+P ∗∗(BA)
= P ∗∗(B|A) · P ∗∗(A)+ P ∗∗(B|A) · P ∗∗(A)
= P ∗∗(B|A) · y + P ∗∗(B|A)(1− y).
Thus xy 6 z6 xy + (1− y), if only P ∗∗(B|A)= x .
It remains to show that for positive y the evidentiation A[y] leaves the conditional
probability unchanged, i.e., P ∗∗(B|A)= P ∗(B|A)= x .
This equation follows immediately from Lemma A.1 in Appendix A, since
P ∗∗(B|A)= P
∗(AB) · y/P ∗(A)
P ∗(A) · y/P ∗(A) = P
∗(B|A).
This completes the proof. Observe that for y = 0.0 the statement of Theorem 1 is
tautological. 2
If a rule B|A[x] is valid and if the evident fact A[y] is very likely, i.e., y ∼ 1., then
Theorem 1 supplies a good estimation for the probability of B . The knowledge inherent in
P ∗ applies even for uncertain evidence A[y].
The order of inference (2), evidence (3) and query (4) is essential for the result of MP as
in (5). We give an example, in which Theorem 1 fails due to the perverted order (3), (2),
(4).
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Table 5
V1 V2 P ∗∗
v¯1 v¯2 0.1
v¯1 v2 0.1
v1 v¯2 0.7
v1 v2 0.1
P ∗∗
v¯1 v¯2 1/3
v¯1 v2 1/3
v1 v¯2 0.0
v1 v2 1/3
Table 6
P ∗
AB (1− x2) ·P 0(B|A)
AB (1− x2) ·P 0(B|A)
AB x2 · (1− x1)
AB x2 · x1
Example 2. For two binary variables V1 and V2 with values v1/v¯1 and v2/v¯2, respectively,
consider the distribution P ∗ in the upper part of Table 5 and verify V1 = v1[x] with
x = 0.8. If now V2 = v2|V1 = v1[y] becomes evident with y = 1.0, we get P ∗∗ below;
cf. Lemma A.2 in Appendix A. Note that
P ∗∗(V2 = v2)= 2/3< x · y = 0.8 · 1.0.
The classical contraposition allows of reverse conclusions in a binary logic:
A→B
B→A.
This indirect reasoning fails to be correct in a probabilistic environment for uncertain
propositions.
A high probability of B|A does not result in an equally high probability ofA|B , not even
for the very simple two-element set R = {B|A[x1],A[x2]}. To show this we first apply
B|A[x1] and then A[x2] to the uniform P 0. Lemmas A.1 and (then) A.2 of Appendix A
yield the result P ∗ as in Table 6.
Note that this distribution P ∗ satisfies both rules, B|A[x1] and A[x2]. (6)
For P ∗(A|B)= z we get immediately
z= 1(
1+ 1− x1
P 0(B|A) ·
x2
1− x2
)
and hence z might assume all values in (0,1), if only x1 ∈ (0,1). Note that the odd
x2/(1− x2) varies in the interval [0,∞).
The probabilistic contraposition is not valid; the less is Modus Tollens, e.g., in the form
B|A [x] (2)
B [1− y] (3)
A [z] (4) .
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Uncertain evidence 1− y does not allow convenient estimations for z as shows the case of
certain evidence. We omit laborious calculations of z; they do not give new insights.
While Modus Ponens is a valid entailment scheme under ME-inference, Modus Tollens
is not. ME-inference is directed.
4.3. Inferencing with aggregated rules
4.3.1. Selected rule aggregations
Kern-Isberner in [10] studies the interaction of several rules in P ∗ and derives
respectable properties for the ME-inference. For literals of binary variables she shows
a transitive chaining, the dominance of categorical specifity and a cautious monotony,
among others. We sketch her results and then analyse the effect of uncertain evidence
in Section 4.3.2.
According to Kern-Isberner for binary variables V1,V2,V3 and their respective values
v1/v¯1, v2/v¯2, v3/v¯3 the following properties hold under ME-inference.
Transitive Chaining.
V3 = v3|V2 = v2[x1], V2 = v2|V1 = v1[x2]
V3 = v3|V1 = v1[xtr = x1 · x2 + (1− x2)/2] (7)
Dominance of Categorical Specifity.
V3 = v3|V2 = v2[x1], V2 = v2|V1 = v1[1.0]
V3 = v3|V1 = v1[x2]
V3 = v3|V1 = v1 ∧ V2 = v2[xcs = x2] (8)
Cautious Monotony.
V3 = v3|V1 = v1[x1], V2 = v2|V1 = v1[x2]
V3 = v3|V1 = v1 ∧ V2 = v2[xcm = x1] (9)
Cautious Cut.
V3 = v3|V1 = v1 ∧ V2 = v2[x1], V2 = v2|V1 = v1[x2]
V3 = v3|V1 = v1[xcc = x1 · x2 + (1− x2)/2] (10)
Conjunction Right.
V2 = v2|V1 = v1[x1], V3 = v3|V1 = v1[x2]
V2 = v2 ∧ V3 = v3|V1 = v1[xcr = x1 · x2] (11)
For a deep discussion of these properties and further results we refer the reader to Kern-
Isberner’s original paper.
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4.3.2. Rule aggregation and evidence
The main objective of the present work is to investigate, how uncertain or virtual
evidence effects on the knowledge inherent in P ∗. In this section we study the question
whether Transitive Chaining, Dominance of Categorical Specifity, Cautious Monotony and
Cautions Cut and finally Conjunction Right remain valid under virtual evidence. What if
the premises are not certain but uncertain, do the conclusions still hold to a certain degree?
Is uncertain reasoning continuous?
Obviously it is for Transitive Chaining, Cautious Cut and Conjunction Right. Because
of MP as in (5), for an evident fact V1 = v1[y] we have:
Transitive Chaining under Virtual Evidence.
V3 = v3[z] and xtr · y 6 z6 xtr · y + (1− y).
Cautious Cut under Virtual Evidence.
V3 = v3[z] and xcc · y 6 z6 xcc · y + (1− y).
Conjunction Right under Virtual Evidence.
V2 = v2 ∧ V3 = v3[z] and xcr · y 6 z6 xcr · y + (1− y).
In all cases the precision of inference grows with y . If the evident premise is very likely
the conclusion’s probability is close to that intended by the rules adapted in P ∗.
Note that in the absence of these obvious properties there would be no sound knowledge
processing under uncertainty.
We now study the effects of uncertain evidence on the Dominance of Categorical
Specifity and on Cautious Monotony.
(8) in connection with (5) reads for the
Dominance of Categorical Specifity under Virtual Evidence.
V3 = v3[z] and xcs · y 6 z6 xcs · y + (1− y).
Obviously the interval for z is the same in both cases,
• either evidencing V1 = v1 ∧ V2 = v2[y],
• or evidencing V1 = v1[y].
This result meets perfectly our intuition, as demonstrated by the following
Example 3. We trouble again the frequently cited penguins, which are birds, but very
likely do not fly. Let us identify V1 = v1 ≡ to be a penguin, V2 = v2 ≡ to be a bird and
V3 = v3 ≡ to have the ability to fly. Now applying (8) with x1 = 0.99 and x2 = 0.01 we get
the resulting rule
V3 = v3|V1 = v1 ∧ V2 = v2[0.01].
Objects which are penguins and birds, very likely do not fly, either.
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If we come to know with y = 95%, that an object is a penguin and a bird, its probability
z of flying lies in the interval 0.01 · 0.956 z6 0.01 · 0.95+ 0.05.
On the other hand, if the knowledge of y = 95% refers to penguins (and not to birds),
only, their probability of flying falls into exactly the same interval.
The categorical specifity “penguin” dominates “bird” even under virtual evidence.
In continuation of the example we now study:
Cautious Monotony under Virtual Evidence.
V3 = v3[z] and xcm · y 6 z6 xcm · y + (1− y).
Assume a direct influence ofV1 = v1 over V3 = v3: V3 = v3|V1 = v1[x1]with x1 = 0.01.
Consider furthermore the impact which V1 = v1 has on V2 = v2: V2 = v2|V1 = v1[x2].
This impact is irrelevant inasmuch as cautious monotony maintains the direct influence
over V3 = v3, even for the conjunctive premise V1 = v1 ∧ V2 = v2: V3 = v3|V1 =
v1 ∧ V2 = v2[0.01]. Penguins are bad flyers, even under the supplementary information,
e.g., x2 = 1.0, that they are birds.
These effects for Cautious Monotony remain true for virtual evidence. Evidencing either
V1 = v1 or V1 = v1 ∧ V2 = v2, each with probability y = 0.95, yields the same result
0.01 · 0.95 6 z 6 0.01 · 0.95 + 0.05. Note that Dominance of Categorical Specifity and
Cautious Monotony have identical consequences for this example.
In the present section we showed that within an ME-framework virtual evidence is
processed correctly for selected aggregated rules. In what follows we study composed
rules.
4.4. Inferring with composed rules
4.4.1. Selected rule compositions
In Section 2 we followed Calabrese and built the language L∗ of rules or conditionals
B|A. In his paper [1] the author goes a step further and composes rules by the connectives
∧, ∨, − and finally by the conditioning operator |. It is the aim of Section 4.4 to study
composed rules under ME-inference and examine their importance for a sound deduction
principle.
We start with a short repetition of Calabreses results, for proofs the reader might consult
the original paper, Theorems 2–4. Given the three-valued logic on {t, f,u}, cf. Section 1,
the composition of conditionals can be defined pointwise:
• [(B|A)∧ (D|C)](v)= [(B|A)(v)] ∧ [(D|C)(v)],
• [(B|A)∨ (D|C)](v)= [(B|A)(v)] ∨ [(D|C)(v)], (12)
• (B|A)(v)= (B|A)(v).
All such composed conditionals are equivalent to simple, i.e., not composed, rules:
• (B|A)∧ (D|C)= [(B ∨A)(D ∨C )]|A∨C,
• (B|A)∨ (D|C)= (AB ∨CD)|A∨C, (13)
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Table 7
| t f u
t t u t
f f u f
u u u u
• B|A= B|A,
and they fulfil de Morgan’s Laws
• [(B|A)∧ (D|C)] = B|A∨D|C,
• [(B|A)∨ (D|C)] = B|A∧D|C. (14)
Note that the expressions on the right side can be simplified further applying (13).
A conditioned conditional might be defined similar to (12). To do so, we agree on the
operations in Table 7 (read, e.g., f |u= f )), and then define again pointwise:
• [(B|A) | (D|C)](v)= (B|A)(v) | (D|C)(v). (15)
Also conditioned conditionals can be reduced to simple rules and hence managed in the
language L∗:
• (B|A) | (D|C)= B|A(D ∨C ). (16)
The reader might check whether these rule compositions meet his logical intuition. Sceptics
we refer to the profound discussion in [1] and to respective applications in [2]. 4
4.4.2. Deduction principles
In the Boolean algebra L we have a deduction principle, which goes back to set-theoretic
inclusion: A ∈ L implies B ∈ L iff A ⊆ B iff for all v, from A(v) = t follows B(v) = t .
Note that in the present paper we do not distinguish between A as an element of L and the
set A of realisations in Ω . So we might express the logical implication by the set-theoretic
inclusion ⊆ and there should be no problem with this assignment. With these agreements
the following statements are equivalent:
• A⊆ B iff A∧B =A (AB =A)
• A⊆ B iff A∨B =A
• A⊆ B iff B|A= t|A
• A⊆ B iff A∨B = t .
These equivalences vanish, if the definitions are applied to L∗ instead of L. So in L∗
different forms of implication arise:
• D|C ∧⊆B|A iff B|A∧D|C =D|C
4 Besides Calabrese’s rule aggregations there are further approaches. Dubois and Prade in [7] give an excellent
overview.
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is the conjunctive implication;
• D|C ∨⊆B|A iff B|A∨D|C = B|A
is the disjunctive implication;
• D|C |⊆B|A iff (B|A) | (D|C)= (t|A) | (D|C) (17)
is called conditional implication;
• D|C m⊆B|A iff (B|A)∨ (D|C)= (t|A∨C)
is called material implication.
Each of the four implications allows a set-theoretic characterisation making it manage-
able in L∗, for proofs see Theorems 8–11 and their respective corollaries in the original
paper [1] 5 :
• D|C ∧⊆ B|A iff A⊆ C and DA⊆ BA,
• D|C ∨⊆ B|A iff C ⊆A and DC ⊆ CB,
• D|C |⊆ B|A iff A(D ∨C)⊆ B,
• D|C m⊆ B|A iff DC ⊆ BA and A(D ∨C )⊆ B.
(18)
With the rule compositions in Section 4.4.1 and the different forms of implication in
Section 4.4.2 we are now ready to combine them with ME-inference.
4.4.3. Rule composition and evidence
In this section we investigate whether composed rules adapted in P ∗ do what we
expect them to do. Let us discuss this question a little further and consider for a moment
(B|A)∧ (D|C).
Obviously we expect from this composed rule two properties:
• If (B|A) ∧ (D|C) is ‘strong’ and if the probability of A is high, then B should be
deducible with a high probability.
• The same should hold for D and C, since (B|A) ∧ (D|C) includes both, B|A and
D|C.
Before we go through a rigorous mathematical analysis, the reader is asked to express in
a similar manner what he expects intuitively from the rules (B|A) ∨ (D|C), B|A, and
(B|A) | (D|C), respectively. Especially the conditioned conditional deserves substantial
care. At least we agree with two statements:
• If (D|C) implies (B|A) like in (17), this should force a ‘strong’ conditioned
conditional (B|A) | (D|C).
• If (B|A) | (D|C) is ‘strong’ and if (D|C) is true, then a probable A should imply a
probable B .
5 Calabrese in [3] describes further deductive relations, whose compatibility with ME-inference we shall
investigate in a later paper.
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After these intuitive reflections we go through a more rigid analysis, and first study the
composed conditional
(B|A)∧ (D|C).
Since this composed rule can be reduced to the simple conditional [(B ∨A)(D ∨ C )]|A
∨C, cf. (13), and because of the probabilistic MP (5) we have
(B|A)∧ (D|C) [x] (2)
A∨C [y] (3)
(B ∨A)(D ∨C ) [z] (4) and z> x · y
(19)
which immediately implies
B ∨A[z] and D ∨C[z] both with z> x · y. (20)
From the above discussion we know that our focus of interest is not the material implication
B ∨A or D ∨C but rather the conditional B|A or D|C.
Here a technical remark is necessary. All proofs in the following lemmas hold for any
probability distribution P . They do not depend on the special structure of the inferred P ∗∗.
Nevertheless we maintain the correct notation so as to emphasise their (the proofs) validity
within the ME-inference framework.
After this technical note we go back to the relations between B ∨A and B|A or D ∨C
and D|C; respectively. The desired results are summarised in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. LetA,B,C,D and x, y be as in (19). For the material implicationsB∨A, D∨
C and the conditionals B|A, D|C the following relations hold:
(i) P ∗∗(B|A)6 P ∗∗(B ∨A) and
P ∗∗(B ∨A)− P ∗∗(B|A)6 (1− x · y)P
∗∗(A)
P ∗∗(A)
. (21)
(ii) P ∗∗(D|C)6 P ∗∗(D ∨C ) and
P ∗∗(D ∨C )−P ∗∗(D|C)6 (1− x · y)P
∗∗(C )
P ∗∗(C)
.
Before a proof we give an obvious interpretation:
• if the composed rule (B|A)∧ (D|C)[x] is strong, i.e., x ∼ 1.,
• if furthermore the premise A∨C[y] of the rule’s decomposed equivalent
[(B ∨A)(D ∨C)]|A∨C
is very likely, i.e., y ∼ 1.,
• if finally the probability P ∗∗(A) is not small,
• then the conditional probability P ∗∗(B|A) is high.
There is an immediate consequence of this interpretation which proves ME-inference to
manage the composed conditional (B|A)∧ (D|C) absolutely correct.
If we attribute a high probability x ∼ 1. to (B|A) ∧ (D|C) and calculate P ∗, then
an evidently probable A—and hence a probable A ∨ C—generates a high conditional
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probability P ∗∗(B|A) and a very likely P ∗∗(B). The same statements are valid for D and
C, respectively. This is exactly what we expected, compare the discussion at the beginning
of this section.
Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) The first inequality is well known, the second inequality follows from
P ∗∗(B ∨A)= 1− P ∗∗(AB )= (1− P ∗∗(AB ))P ∗∗(A)
P ∗∗(A)
= (1− P
∗∗(AB ))(P ∗∗(BA)+ P ∗∗(BA))
P ∗∗(A)
= P
∗∗(BA)+ P ∗∗(BA)(1−P ∗∗(A))
P ∗∗(A)
= P ∗∗(B|A)+ P ∗∗(BA)P
∗∗(A)
P ∗∗(A)
and from P ∗∗(BA)6 1− x · y , cf. (20).
(ii) Analogously. 2
Note that the reversal of the lemma’s interpretation is not true. Even for P ∗∗(A) =
P ∗∗(C) = 1. and P ∗∗(B|A) = P ∗∗(D|C) = 1/2, P ∗∗((B|A) ∧ (D|C)) might be equal
to 0. For a proof choose P ∗∗(BADC)= P ∗∗(BADC)= 1/2.
This completes our analysis of (B|A) ∧ (C|D). We now study the second composed
conditional
B|A∨D|C.
Since this composed rule can be reduced to the simple conditional
B|A∨D|C = (B|A)∧ (D|C)= (B ∨A)(D ∨C)|A∨C,
cf. (14), and because of the probabilistic MP (5) we have
(B|A)∧ (D|C) [1− x] (2)
A∨C [y] (3)
(B ∨A)(D ∨C ) [z] (4) and z> (1− x) · y
(22)
which implies immediately
B ∨A[z] and D ∨C[z] both with z> (1− x) · y.
From the above discussion we know that our focus of interest is not the material implication
B ∨A or D ∨C but rather the conditional B|A or D|C and finally B|A or D|C.
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The desired results are again summarised in a lemma.
Lemma 2. LetA,B,C,D and x, y be as in (22). For the material implicationsB∨A, D∨
C and the conditionals B|A, D|C the following relations hold:
(i) P ∗∗(B|A)6 P ∗∗(B ∨A) and
P ∗∗(B ∨A)− P ∗∗(B|A)6 (1− (1− x) · y)P ∗∗(A)
P ∗∗(A)
.
(ii) P ∗∗(D|C)6 P ∗∗(D ∨C ) and
P ∗∗(D ∨C )− P ∗∗(D|C)6 (1− (1− x) · y)P ∗∗(C )
P ∗∗(C)
.
The obvious interpretation now reads:
• if the composed rule B|A∨D|C[x] is weak, i.e., x ∼ 0.,
• if furthermore the premise A ∨ C[y] of the rule’s decomposed equivalent [(B ∨
A)(D ∨C )]|A∨C is very likely, i.e., y ∼ 1.,
• if finally the probability P ∗∗(A) is not small,
• then the conditional probability P ∗∗(B|A) is low.
Again we assert, that ME-inference manages ∨-compositions of conditionals correctly. If
(B|A)∨ (D|C) has a low probability x ∼ 0. in P ∗, then a probable evident A—and hence
a probable A∨C—generates a weak conditional P ∗∗(B|A) and consequently an unlikely
P ∗∗(B). The same is true for D and C, respectively.
The proof of Lemma 2 is similar to that of Lemma 1; the reversal of the lemma’s
interpretation is not true, either. Even if we have P ∗∗(A)= P ∗∗(C)= 1. and P ∗∗(B|A)=
P ∗∗(D|C)= 1/2, P ∗∗((B|A)∨ (D|C)) might be equal to 1. Choose again P ∗∗(BADC)
= P ∗∗ (BADC)= 1/2.
This completes our analysis of (B|A)∨ (D|C). We now study the negated rule
B|A.
Since this negated rule can be reduced to the simple conditional B|A= B|A, cf. (13), and
because of the probabilistic MP (5), we have
B|A [x] (2)
A [y] (3)
B [z] (4) and x · y 6 z6 x · y + (1− y).
(23)
The interpretation of (23) is straightforward, just as the proof. In the remaining part of the
present section we direct our attention to conditioned conditionals
(B|A) | (D|C).
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Since this composed rule can be reduced to the simple conditional B|A(D ∨C ), cf. (16),
and because of the probabilistic MP (5) we have
(B|A)|(D|C) [x] (2)
A(D ∨C ) [y] (3)
B [z] (4) and x · y 6 z6 x · y + (1− y).
(24)
So B is deducible from A(D ∨ C ) if only the composed rule is strong. Note that this
property is independent from the validity of any implication in (17), but only depends on
the strength of virtual evidence.
An interesting question is whether A(D ∨C )[y] can be replaced by separate evidence,
A[y1] and D|C[y2]. The answer to this question is yes, as shows the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let P ∗∗ be an inferred distribution, such that for any A, D, C the respective
probabilities are: P ∗∗(A)= y1, P ∗∗(D|C)= y2, P ∗∗(A(D∨C ))= y . Then the following
inequalities hold
(i) y1 > y and y2 > P ∗∗(DC)/(P ∗∗(DC)+ 2(1− y)).
(ii) y > y1 + y2 − 1.
Lemma 3 suggests a modified MP which meets our intuition for a sound reasoning, see
(24′). (24) and (24′) are closely related by (i) and (ii).
(B|A)|(D|C) [x] (2)
A [y1] (3)
(D|C) [y2]
B [z] (4) and z> x · (y1 + y2 − 1).
(24′)
Proof of Lemma 3.
(i) P ∗∗(A(D ∨C ))= y implies
P ∗∗(A)> y and P ∗∗(D|C)> P
∗∗(DC)
P ∗∗(DC)+ 2(1− y) .
The second inequality follows from
P ∗∗(D|C)= P
∗∗(DC)
P ∗∗(DC)+ P ∗∗(ADC)+ P ∗∗(ADC)
and from both P ∗∗(ADC)6 1− y and P ∗∗(ADC)6 1− y .
(ii) From P ∗∗(D|C)= y2 we have P ∗∗(D ∨C )> y2 and hence
P ∗∗
(
(D ∨C )A)+ P ∗∗((D ∨C )A )> y2.
Reordering terms yields
P ∗∗
(
(D ∨C )A)> y2 −P ∗∗((D ∨C )A )> y2 − (1− y1)= y1 + y2 − 1. 2
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The remaining part of this section is dedicated to study relations between the
∧⊆, ∨⊆,
|⊆, m⊆-implications and ME-inference. Do these implications generate strong rules and
vice versa? Are the deduction principles of Calabrese compatible with the ME-inference
process? We study these questions in the next section.
4.4.4. Deduction schemes and ME-inference
In Theorem 2 we shall show that the set-theoretical relations
D|C ∧⊆, |⊆, m⊆ B|A
necessarily imply a certain rule (B|A) | (D|C)[1.] in any distribution P and consequently
in any P ∗. Whatever your knowledge base is, if a conditional D|C implies B|A by
∧⊆, |⊆, m⊆, the corresponding conditioned conditional is certain; with the exception of ill
cases.
The contrary is not true. The probabilistic rule (B|A) | (D|C)[1.] cannot cause set-
theoretical relations. But at least it implies a weak form of D|C |⊆ B|A in P ∗, see
Lemma 4. With these remarks we formulate
Theorem 2 (Implications and certain rules).
(i) If for any A, B, C, D the conjunctive implication
D|C ∧⊆ B|A
holds, then either (B|A) | (D|C)[1.] or the conditioned conditional is not defined.
(ii) If for any A, B, C, D the conditional implication
D|C |⊆ B|A
holds, then either (B|A) | (D|C)[1.] or the conditioned conditional is not defined.
(iii) If for any A, B, C, D the material implication
D|C m⊆ B|A
holds, then either (B|A) | (D|C)[1.] or the conditioned conditional is not defined.
Proof. We only prove (i) and show, how mere set-theoretical properties obviously imply a
certain rule. As the proofs of (ii) and (iii) are similar, they are left to the reader.
(i) From (18) we know that D|C ∧⊆ B|A is equivalent to A⊆ C and DA⊆ BA. Hence
ABD = ∅ and A(D ∨C )=AD ∨AC =AD, implying immediately
P
(
(B|A) | (D|C))= P (B|A(D ∨C ))= P(B|AD)
= P(ABD)
P(ABD)+ P(ABD) =
P(ABD)
P(ABD)
.
This ratio is either 1. or undefined, if P(ABD)= 0.0. 2
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We consider the following Example 4 from Calabrese [1, p. 88]. It served to show that
D|C ∧⊆ B|A does not necessarily imply P(D|C)6 P(B|A).
Even if in the light of our paper there is no need for such a property—as there is no need
in Calabrese’s paper, either—the example is very helpful for the insight of Theorem 2(i)
and (ii).
Example 4. C =Ω, A=D, B =D and P(D)= 1/2. Verify that D|C ∧⊆ B|A from (18)
and that P(B|A)= .0, but P(D|C)= 1/2.
The example does not apply to Theorem 2(i), since P(DBA) = 0.0, nor to MP (24),
the latter for two reasons: (B|A) | (D|C) is undefined and A(D ∨ C )[0.0]. Note that this
example fails to apply to Theorem 2(ii).
Example 4 does not meet the characterisations of material implication like in (18). The
following example does.
Example 5. D = C, A=D meets (18) for material implication; but it does neither apply
to Theorem 2(iii) nor to MP (24).
Conjunctive, conditional and material implication are strong, which is not true for the
disjunctive implication.
Example 6. A =Ω, C = ∅ and P(B) = ε ∼ 0.0. Verify D|C ∨⊆ B|A via (18) and note
that
P
(
(B|A) | (D|C))= P (B|A(D ∨C ))= P(BΩ)= P(B)= ε.
Now we study the reverse question. Is a certain rule (B|A) | (D|C)[1.] sufficient for any
of the implications
∧⊆, ∨⊆, |⊆, m⊆?
Of course not, since these implications are of set-theoretical nature and cannot follow from
a probabilistic rule. But at least
|⊆ holds in a weaker sense.
Let us define for arbitrary events E,F from L: E
∗⊆ F iff P ∗(FE) = 0. With this
definition we have the following
Lemma 4. Let P ∗ be an inferred distribution such that P ∗((B|A) | (D|C)) = 1. then
P ∗(BA(D ∨C ))= 0. and hence A(D ∨C ) ∗⊆ B .
Because of Lemma 4 the conditioned implication D|C |⊆ B|C is almost sure, cf. the
implication’s equivalent in (18). Similar statements for ∧⊆, ∨⊆, m⊆ do not hold.
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Example 7.
(i) With B =Ω, D = C and P ∗(AC ) > 0 we have
P ∗
(
(B|A) | (D|C))= 1. but not A ∗⊆ C. ∧⊆ is not almost sure.
(ii) With B =Ω, D = C, P ∗(AC ) > 0 and P ∗(AC) > 0 we have
P ∗
(
(B|A) | (D|C))= 1. but not C ∗⊆A. ∨⊆ is not almost sure.
(iii) With D =Ω, B =Ω, P ∗(A) > 0 and P ∗(DCBA) > 0 we have
P ∗
(
(B|A) | (D|C))= 1. but notDC ∗⊆ BA. m⊆ is not almost sure.
A certain conditioned conditional is the most natural pendant to the conditioned
implication of Calabrese and not to conjunctive, disjunctive nor material implication.
Resuming the results of this section we have:
• Evidencing the premises of the composed rules
(B|A)∧ (D|C)[x], (B|A)∨ (D|C)[x], B|A[x]
yields the expected results; see (19), (22), (23).
• Evidencing the premises of the composed rule (B|A) | (D|C)[x] yields the expected
result even in the absence of any of the implications
∧⊆, ∨⊆, |⊆, m⊆;
refer to (24).
• If A, B, C, D are such that one of the implications
∧⊆, |⊆, m⊆
holds, this guaranties a strong rule (B|A) | (D|C)[1.]. The implication ∨⊆ does not
have this property; see Theorem 2 and Example 6.
• A certain rule (B|A) | (D|C)[1.] implies
D|C |⊆ B|C
in a weak sense; refer to Lemma 4.
The ME-inference process presented for the language L∗ in Section 3, in a natural way
can be extended to conditionals composed by ∧, ∨, |, − . Therefore:
• Knowledge acquisition can be realised in a very rich and comfortable language based
on literals of variables with finite domain.
• Knowledge processing as inference from situative facts and rules and from the
knowledge base can be performed in an equally comfortable language.
• Finally the questions to be answered by the system allow the same complex structure.
All three steps of knowledge processing are available in an expert system shell called
SPIRIT for large scale applications.
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5. Summary and further research
ME-inference is performed by adapting probability distributions on finite sets of finite-
valued variables to facts and rules, preserving maximum entropy or minimum relative
entropy from a uniform prior. This preservation is essential for a sound knowledge
processing, making ME-inference the only method which meets ambitious axiomatic
requirements. It avoids unnecessary dependencies among variables and is the only principle
to do so.
ME-inference consists of three steps:
• Knowledge Acquisition. Here a distribution P ∗ is generated, which satisfies a set of
facts and rules and respects the Principle of Maximum Entropy.
• Knowledge Processing. Here P ∗ is transformed by virtue of situative and evident facts
and rules into P ∗∗, respecting the Principle of Minimum Relative Entropy.
• Knowledge Utilisation. Here basic and situative knowledge is combined to respond to
queries.
This inference process is a generalisation of Bayes’ method. It allows for the very rich
syntax L∗ of conditionals and thus obeys the intrinsic properties of a three-valued logic. It
even can treat composed rules, built by conjunction, disjunction, negation and conditioning
of conditionals. ME-inference is compatible with the deduction mechanism of conditional
implication.
ME-inference is realised by the system SPIRIT permitting the management of hundreds
of facts and rules on umpteen variables.
The freedom to formulate and aggregate arbitrary facts and rules in the knowledge
base P ∗ allows of a very complex knowledge representation. This complexity, however,
might cause serious problems because it makes a consistency check extremely difficult. So
the facts and rules supplied by the user may be contradictory. One of our active fields of
research is the avoidance or elimination of such inconsistencies.
The reader interested in the system SPIRIT is invited to visit our homepage http://www.
fernuni-hagen.de/BWLOR/forsch.htm or contact us by e-mail wilhelm.roedder@fernuni-
hagen.de.
Appendix A
In this appendix we give the solutions of the optimisation problems (2) and (3) in
Section 3. The reader may find proofs in [4] or [13]. Without loss of generality we solve
(2); for (3) replace P 0 by P ∗ and R by E.
Lemma A.1 (Inference of a fact). The solution of
MinR(Q,P 0)
subject to Q(B|Ω)= x
is P ∗ with
P ∗(v)= P 0(v) ·
{
(1− x)/P 0(B ), v ∈B,
x/P 0(B), v ∈B.
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Lemma A.2 (Inference of a rule). The solution of
MinR(Q,P 0)
subject to Q(B|A)= x
is P ∗ with
P ∗(v)= P 0(v) ·
P
∗(A)/P 0(A), v ∈A,
(1− x) · P ∗(A)/P 0(AB ), v ∈AB,
x · P ∗(A)/P 0(AB), v ∈AB,
and
P ∗(A)= P
0(AB)xP 0(AB )1−x
P 0(AB)xP 0(AB )1−x + P 0(A)xx(1− x)1−x .
Theorem A.3 (Inference of several rules, IPS). The solution of
MinR(Q,P 0)
subject to Q(Bi |Ai)= xi, i = 1, . . . , I ,
is P ∗, where P ∗ is the limit distribution of P 0,P 1, . . . ,P k−1,P k, . . . and
Pk(v)= Pk−1(v) ·
P
k(Ai)/P
k−1(Ai), v ∈Ai ,
(1− xi)P k(Ai)/P k−1(AiBi), v ∈AiBi ,
xiP
k(Ai)/P
k−1(AiBi), v ∈AiBi ,
for i = kmod I . Here
Pk(Ai)= P
k−1(AiBi)xiP k−1(AiBi)1−xi
P k−1(AiBi)xiP k−1(AiBi)1−xi +Pk−1(Ai)xixi (1− xi)1−xi
.
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